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Charged with indifference to women's interests, Gilder would 
reply that the female's true interests depend on allowing the male to 
develop a healthy sexual identity. This will not sound strange to the 
millions of women in this and past generations who have spent their 
lives following the advice that Gilder offers. But sociology and eco-
nomics tell us that if current trends threaten to dissolve the bonds 
that check male aggression, we will have to find other ways to pre-
serve those bonds. Today's small families do not occupy anyone's 
full-time attention for more than a brief period. Even if the woman 
happily accepts the role of mother in the home, she will naturally 
seek other outlets eventually, and jobs are society's measures of 
worth. In any event, women have been entering the workforce in 
increasing numbers since 1964, and it was predictable that as one-
earner families became two-earner families, living costs and new 
minimum standards of the good life would rise to meet new income 
levels. For most families, the choices Gilder urges are not realisti-
cally available. Still, it is not easy to resist the thought that Gilder 
is on to something when one sees the divorce statistics, and the daily 
reports linking the persistence of poverty and high crime rates to 
single parent families. We can learn from Gilder even while re-
jecting some of his arguments and innuendoes. 
GENDER JUSTICE. By David L. Kirp,1 Mark G. Yudof,2 
Marlene S. Franks.3 Chicago, 11.: University of Chicago 
Press. 1986. Pp. x, 296. $19.95. 
Suzanna Sherry4 
Gender Justice is an avowedly liberal tract on the problems of 
gender discrimination in our society. It seeks to provide an alterna-
tive to the visions of both conservatives and radical feminists. The 
book fails in its liberal mission for some of the same reasons that the 
new breed of Democrats cannot seem to raise much of a challenge 
to the Republican ideology currently sweeping the country. The 
authors endorse many of the policies advocated by conservatives-
they reject affirmative action and comparable worth, for example-
but they do so by means of a liberal, process-oriented approach. 
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The book thus fails to engage either conservative or radical feminist 
critics of liberalism on their own terms. The result is a watered-
down liberalism which neither satisfies the needs of women nor 
meets the conservative anti-feminist premises head-on. 
The authors explicitly set out their traditional liberal approach 
in chapter one. Liberal society is process oriented in that results 
matter less than the method by which results are obtained, and indi-
vidualist in that the correct process is unfettered personal choice. 
What is most important is that the government "should not be fos-
tering ... 'good lives' by imposing a particular conception of virtue 
on the minority."s In other words, "(l]iberty is concerned with the 
process of choice, not its outcomes . . . . "6 The authors describe 
both conservative and radical feminist theories, by contrast, as re-
sult oriented: such a society "deliberately defines the good life for 
its members. "7 
This dichotomy between a pluralist society in which each indi-
vidual chooses among competing visions of the good and virtuous 
life, and a society in which the community itself shapes and enforces 
a dominant view of the good life, is the paradigmatic difference be-
tween modem Lockean liberalism and classical pre-Enlightenment 
republicanism. Two major features distinguish classical republican-
ism from its ideological successor, liberalism. First, republicans 
conceived of the society in organic terms, as an independent entity, 
apart from its members. The common good was thus distinct from, 
and paramount to, the good of individuals, who might be expected 
to repress their own selfish desires for the common good. To foster 
the self-restraint necessary for individuals to subordinate their own 
interests to the good of the state, republicanism relied on its second 
distinguishing feature: an emphasis on individual capacity for civic 
virtue, on which public virtue ultimately rested. Republicanism 
thus reflected a moral theory congruent with that of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, and rarely invoked by modem philosophers. It is a theory 
of individual virtue and aspiration, an example of what Ronald 
Dworkin calls a "goal-based" theory: the goal for which both indi-
viduals and governments strive is the attainment of virtue. Virtue, 
or the good life, is both identifiable and attainable. Government is a 
deliberative process engaged in the conscious selection of values. 
Modem liberalism-especially as portrayed in this book-re-
jects both community and virtue, placing the individual and indi-
5. D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 135 (1986) [hereinafter 
GENDER JUSTICE] (quoting Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 
117 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978)). 
6. /d. at 134. 
7. /d. at 23. 
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vidual rights at the center. The community is merely a collection of 
individuals. The end of government is not to promote virtue but to 
secure individual liberty, allowing each individual to define his own 
values. A liberal society is thus quintessentially individualist and 
pluralist, and the authors of Gender Justice repeatedly stress the im-
portance of governmental nurturance of diverse individual value 
choices. Unfortunately, they do not provide a convincing justifica-
tion for preferring radical individualism to virtue. Instead, they 
take refuge in moral relativism, the last resort of those who seek to 
reject teleological moral theories. The first chapter canvasses the 
myriad "principled" approaches that various contemporary philos-
ophers apply to the problems of gender, and concludes that because 
there is no consensus as to the correct approach, the search must be 
abandoned in favor of individual resolution.s 
This failure to meet the challenge of the conservative and femi-
nist reliance on teleological or virtue-based morality is the book's 
greatest weakness. Those who agree with the authors that neither 
the conservative nor the radical feminist vision of gender policy is 
truly gender justice must first recognize the increasing bankruptcy 
of the liberal paradigm. The liberal emphasis on autonomy to the 
virtual exclusion of community, and its insistence that only individ-
ual moral choices count, leads to an impoverished perception of 
human beings. We are inescapably both autonomous individuals 
and members of communities, and any approach that fails to accord 
sufficient attention to our social nature is thereby inadequate. Per-
haps the growing dissatisfaction with liberalism, and the concomi-
tant growth of the far left and the far right (both of which de-
emphasize individualism), stems in part from this inadequacy.9 A 
truly persuasive description of gender justice would recognize that 
because we are inevitably communal, some moral decisions must be 
made communally. The task would then be to outline and defend 
particular results against the results proffered by conservatives and 
radicals. 
Ironically, the authors themselves recognize this dual nature of 
humanness in one context: the family. They warn against any pol-
icy on family life which "turn[s] the aspiration of individualism into 
a too-simple slogan." 10 What these good liberals fail to notice is 
that individualism can be elevated into a distorting force outside the 
8. Jd. at 23-26. 
9. In keeping with their masquerade as neo-Jiberals with something new to offer, the 
authors declaim in general terms about the need to recognize more than the primacy of the 
individual and individual choice. See, e.g., id. at 65-66, 69. Their more specific suggestions, 
however, rely on individual autonomy to the virtual exclusion of any other value. 
10. Jd. at 176. 
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context of the family as well. II Moreover, in the context of the fam-
ily, the book advocates certain moral positions beyond the neutral 
"individual choice" of the marketplace. They propose that in addi-
tion to tolerating and encouraging the diverse family structures that 
result from unfettered individual choice, the government ought to 
offer economic support to families-but only selectively. They pro-
pose that the government should subsidize "those family forms that 
offer long term benefits to society," but not "those that promise 
only immediate benefits to their present participants," because the 
latter, "while doubtless nurturing to the partners, further no strong 
societal goal."J2 It is difficult to fathom which family forms might 
meet the authors' criteria (the surrounding passages suggest that all 
and only those engaged in childrearing would do so), but it is clear 
that they are advocating a particular vision of virtuous behavior to 
be encouraged and subsidized. 
Even if the reader accepts the paradigm of individual choice, 
the book's particular translation of it into gender policy suffers from 
serious flaws. The authors suggest four "choice-enhancing" ele-
ments of "sound gender policy": 
Individuals must have the opportunity to choose, the capacity to make choices, in-
formation on which to base preferences, and a climate of tolerance in which to ex-
plore alternatives.13 
These four elements, although they have the ring of a panacea for 
gender injustice, essentially reduce to a lack of governmental re-
straints, prohibitions on overt discrimination by employers and 
other organized entities, plus a sufficient economic "safety net" and 
a little publicity about equal opportunity.J4 Following the liberal 
tradition of Isaiah Berlin, the authors of Gender Justice envision 
liberty primarily as "negative liberty" or freedom from restraint; to 
the extent that the required capacity to choose encompasses "posi-
tive liberty," it does so only in non-gender aspects. The capacity to 
choose is enhanced by "assurances that the basic social and eco-
nomic wants of persons have been satisfied,"1s but such remedies as 
guaranteeing a minimum number of positions for women in tradi-
II. Liberals, of course, are not the only ones who find such distinctions between the 
family and the marketplace. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and 
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983). 
12. GENDER JuSTICE, supra note 5, at 175. Thomas Grey has suggested that the 
Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this principle insofar as it safeguards from governmen-
tal interference any type of relationship which, like the traditional family, serves as a stabiliz-
ing force in society. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 83 (1980). 
13. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 135 (emphasis in original). 
14. ld. at 131-35. 
15. /d. at 133. 
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tionally male occupations are not seen as choice enhancing, and are 
therefore rejected.I6 
Moreover, in a brief, uninformative, and unconvincing discus-
sion of how courts differ from legislatures, the authors conclude 
that, in general, positive liberty should be left to legislatures to 
impose: 
For instance, a court should not condemn government failure to enrich choice by 
not supplying free child care for working parents, since whatever the merits of this 
idea, failure to implement it does not instance disrespect to individual autonomy 
premised on sex.l7 
In a society where most of the responsibility for child care falls on 
women, limiting their opportunities to participate in the workforce, 
it is ignoring reality to say that governmental neglect of the problem 
is not an example of "disrespect to individual autonomy premised 
on sex." 
This narrow description of what constitutes an opportunity 
and a capacity to choose reflects a naive and uncritical viewpoint. 
The authors fail to explore perhaps the most difficult issue of gender 
discrimination: the interaction of societal pressures and individual 
choice. For example, in contending that the largely gender-segre-
gated workforce is at least partly the result of individual choice 
rather than discrimination, the authors suggest that women choose 
certain low-prestige jobs for three reasons. Such work enables wo-
men to "shape work around the demands of home life," to "stop 
working or work part time while raising a family," and to relocate 
easily in order to accommodate their husbands' career paths.1s 
There is not even a hint that the individual woman's choice to 
subordinate her own life to her husband's (taking over responsibility 
for the children and the home) is not, in fact, wholly her own 
16. See, e.g., id. at 136, 159-67. The authors engage in the usual semantic games when 
they discuss affirmative action, referring to such programs as "quotas." Regardless of the 
merits of affirmative action, there is an important distinction between a quota, which limits 
the maximum number of women, and most affirmative action programs, which simply guar-
antee a minimum number of positions available to women. The book's main criticism of 
affirmative action is that it is designed "to equalize the distribution of male and female work-
ers throughout the workforce." ld. at 160. This might be true of quotas, but the goal of most 
affirmative action programs is simply to ensure that women who have been excluded from 
certain occupations in the past are able and encouraged to choose those occupations today, 
and that the subtlest vestiges of discrimination are eliminated. The contours of the notion of 
ability to choose are discussed in the text. 
17. Id. at 112. The authors discuss the role of the courts generally at page 85. 
18. Id. at 150-51. While the authors recognize that not all women who are in low-
prestige jobs fit this pattern, they do suggest that the women who fit the pattern are making 
free choices. Even if true, the discontinuity in employment caused by these family responsi-
bilities accounts for only one-third of the wage gap between white men and white women, and 
only one-quarter of the wage gap between white men and black women. G. DUNCAN, YEARS 
OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 161-63 (1984). 
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choice. From liberalism's individualist vantage point, any decision 
made with sufficient knowledge and a superficial absence of re-
straints is an individual choice. An approach which integrates indi-
vidual selves and their social context would find it necessary to 
explore the more subtle societal forces that influenced the particular 
choice, before concluding that it was the individual's choice.l9 
In another passage, the book's failure to recognize the subtle-
ties that lie between individual choice and coercion is even more 
explicit. In noting that pervasive discrimination does affect individ-
ual choices, the authors suggest that" 'I don't want to' is sometimes 
hard to distinguish from 'You can't' ": as the latter diminishes, 
choice becomes more open.2o In reality, choice can be as con-
stricted by "You shouldn't," or "You may, but these are the conse-
quences," as by the simple "You can't." Like Richard Posner, the 
authors rely on individual choice as the basis for law and morality, 
but, like Posner, they have a utopian view of what it means to 
choose.2' 
The book also naively overstates the degree to which overt dis-
crimination ("you can't") has been reduced, painting a rosy picture 
of an almost gender-neutral society. Chapter two documents the 
history of gender discrimination, although with little attention to 
detail and devoted largely to distinguishing gender discrimination 
from race discrimination. Paternalism toward women, unlike pa-
ternalism toward blacks, was motivated by benevolence, and "un-
dertaken with the human worth of women in mind."22 The authors 
thus revive the distinction between pedestal and cage, a distinction 
long abandoned by all but conservatives and, apparently, their nee-
liberal imitators. 
Moving into the present, the authors find gender discrimina-
tion mostly eradicated, maintaining that "[t]he evidence of the past 
decade gives cause to believe that, offered the opportunity, men and 
women will take more control over their own lives."23 In support 
of this statement and of their general attitude that only minimal 
changes are necessary to achieve gender justice, the authors rely on 
inaccurate and inconsistent "facts." In the context of the market-
19. For a brief exploration of this issue in the course of another scholar's review of 
GENDER JUSTICE, see Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender 
Justice 96 YALE L.J. 914, 931-40 (1987). 
20. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 152. The authors do recognize one way in which 
society affects individual choices: where an individual perceives her choices as limited, she 
will do less to protect what choices she has. Id. at 146-47. 
21. See West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). 
22. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 43-44. 
23. !d. at 137; see also id. at p. 47. 
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place, for example, they allege that "[t]he work force is more sexu-
ally integrated in particular fields."24 This conflicts with both their 
own statement ten pages later-"[i]n 1980, three-quarters of all wo-
men crowded into occupations where women made up a majority of 
the work force"2s-and with the findings of other researchers.26 
Moreover, despite the fact that they conclude that sex segregation 
in the workplace causes "much of the disparity" between men's and 
women's wages,21 they do not view either segregation or the wage 
gap as cause for concern or for much government intervention. 
While flexible or part-time work schedules "appeal[] intuitively to 
the proponent of choice," government should not mandate such in-
novations, because employers will simply circumvent them. In-
stead, government can offer firms information about flexible 
working schedules.2s While "[n]on-discrimination is ... essential 
to securing choice," government options to combat discrimination 
are similarly limited. In addition to existing proscriptions on overt 
discrimination, the authors advocate prohibiting employers from 
enforcing dress codes or from discriminating against homosexu-
als.29 The former is so trivial as to be almost deliberately belittling 
of working women's needs; the latter, while a laudable goal, has 
little to do with gender discrimination. What government may not 
do to combat gender discrimination, according to the authors of 
Gender Justice, is mandate or condone either affirmative action pro-
grams or comparable worth. Affirmative action is wrong because 
"[q]uotas deny the primacy of individuals."3o Comparable worth is 
both impossible to achieve and unnecessary: "Reliance on a market 
rid of its discriminatory elements enhances individual choice and 
equity for men and women more effectively than manipulating the 
wage structure."31 These arguments have been made before, but 
not often by self-proclaimed liberals and not often so superficially. 
In further support of their position that recent gains by women 
indicate little further governmental intervention is necessary, the 
authors point to a number of changes within the family. "Nearly 
one household in seven is now headed by a woman," "[m]ore than 
half the populace believes that husbands as well as wives should 
24. ld. at 173. 
25. ld. at 147. 
26. See, e.g., SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, 
REMEDIES (B. Reskin ed. 1984); Beller, Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, in 
CoMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 26-27 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1984). 
27. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 147. 
28. Id. at 155-56. 
29. Id. at 158. 
30. Id. at 166; see generally id. at 159-67. 
31. Id. at 168-69. 
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care for small children," and "[t]here is now overwhelming support 
for women who opt to work."32 The phenomenon of women heads 
of households has contributed only to the feminization of poverty, 
not to the liberation of women.33 The fact that half the population 
believes men should have childcare responsibilities does not mean 
that very many men fulfill such responsibilities: childcare is still 
primarily a woman's responsibility even in two-career families.34 
And while there may be popular support for women who work, 
even the authors themselves recognize that the crushing burden of 
family responsibilities keeps many women from full participation in 
the workforce.3s 
Gender Justice not only presents a naively optimistic view of 
the progress toward equality, it is strikingly unfair to its adversaries. 
Presentation of the radical feminist viewpoint ranges from simplis-
tic to deliberately distorted. The authors reduce much of the femi-
nist scholarship to tirades against a male conspiracy: "Marxist 
feminists ... explain the earnings gap as a plot by men to retain 
their superiority."36 The feminist view of the segregated workforce 
is similarly described: "The radical feminist envisions a male plot 
to tum women workers into a kind of ladies auxiliary for the human 
race."37 This simplistic view is very likely derived from the same 
shortcoming that informs the authors' view of women's "choices": 
an inability to recognize a spectrum between fully intentional 
choices ("plots") and acts utterly beyond control of the individual. 
This failure to recognize the mixed nature of prejudice is most 
apparent in the authors' brief criticism of the feminist explanation 
of segregation in the workplace, employers' prejudice. The authors 
suggest that such an explanation "strain[s] credulity": 
If one sees men as "homo-social" beings-that is, interested in working with other 
men, not women-who have created segregated working conditions in order to as-
sociate with one another, the theory acquires a certain bite. Yet this is a couple-
oriented, not a "night out with the boys (or girls)," society; why should work and 
32. /d. at 137. 
33. See, e.g., G. DUNCAN, supra note 18, at 48-52; L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECfED SociAL AND EcONOMIC CoNSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN 
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56 (1985). 
34. See, e.g., Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Strug-
gle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc. 366, 388-93 (1981); 
Kay, Legal and Social Impediments to Dual Career Marriages, 12 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 
207, 220 (1979); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 995-96 
n.158 (1984). 
35. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 150-51 (women choose less demanding occupa-
tions in order to accommodate family responsibilities); see id. at 190-94 (some type of child-
care allowance is necessary). 
36. /d. at 145. 
37. /d. at 148. 
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leisure preferences differ?38 
In fact, the prejudice that feminists suggest creates segregated work-
places is not a desire to associate only with one's own gender, it is a 
desire to treat as peers only one's own gender. It strains credulity to 
believe that the authors of Gender Justice are unaware of this basic 
distinction. 
Gender Justice is excellently researched, and exhibits an as-
tounding familiarity with the literature in numerous diverse fields. 
Despite this, the authors manage to ignore reality in creating their 
gender policy.39 They call for vigorous enforcement of current an-
tidiscrimination laws, but oppose policies designed to combat the 
more subtle general discrimination that pervades society. Govern-
ment interference with the forces that influence individual discrimi-
nation is kept to a minimum. The only real change suggested is 
government encouragement and subsidization of childraising alter-
natives, but the authors' justification for that policy is less to free 
women from the choice-constraining burdens of childrearing than 
simply to recognize the reality that most mothers work out of eco-
nomic necessity: "[P]olicy must contend with the reality that many 
children now receive care outside the home."40 Moreover, the sug-
gestion of a cash allowance directly to parents rather than govern-
ment support of day care is apparently designed to encourage one 
parent to stay at home.4I The authors, in keeping with their failure 
to recognize that individual choices are heavily influenced by insti-
tutionalized discrimination and stereotypes, apparently believe that 
which parent chooses to stay home will be a gender-neutral individ-
ual decision. In light of the thoroughness and breadth of the au-
thors' knowledge, it is difficult to believe that all these analytical 
and informational lapses are inadvertent. In the end, Gender Justice 
is little more than an apology for the status quo. 
38. /d. at 149 (footnotes omitted). 
39. Others have noticed that GENDER JusncE also ignores much recent scholarship, 
especially feminist scholarship. See Finley, supra note 19, at 914-15; Menkel·Meadow, 
Gendered Justice, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 258, 265 (1986). 
40. GENDER JumcE, supra note 5, at 193. 
41. /d. at 192·94. 
